In this paper we argue that in realistically calibrated two period general equilibrium models with incomplete markets CAPM-pricing provides a good benchmark for equilibrium prices even when agents are not mean-variance optimizers and returns are not normally distributed. We numerically approximate equilibria for a variety of di erent speci cations for preferences, endowments and dividends and compare the equilibrium prices and portfolio-holdings to the predictions of CAPM. While we show that CAPM cannot hold exactly for the chosen speci cation, it turns out that pricing-errors are extremely small. Furthermore, two-fund separation holds approximately.
Introduction
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) predicts that equilibrium returns of assets are a linear function of their market (the slope in the regression of a security's return on the market's return). This intuitively appealing result has long shaped the way practitioners think about average returns and risk. While the model fares poorly in explaining observed cross-sectional stock returns (see for example Fama and French (1992) ) it remains one of the central building blocks in nancial economics.
One of the reasons for this is that the CAPM provides a good theoretical starting point for the examination of asset prices. Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990) show that CAPM can be viewed as a special case of the general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets (the GEI-model). Oh (1996) , Willen (1997) and others have shown that the central conclusions of CAPM, the pricing formula, holds true under completely general dividends and endowments as long as all agents have mean-variance utility functions.
However, without mean-variance preferences one has to make v ery strong assumptions on the distribution of asset pay-o s in order to derive the conclusions of CAPM 1 . Berk (1997) shows that joint restrictions on utility functions and asset returns cannot lead to more realistic assumptions. He shows that if one assumes that agents have v on-NeumannMorgenstern utility functions, quadratic utility is necessary for the CAPM-pricing formula to hold. Since quadratic utility is an unattractive assumption, it is an important question whether CAPM-pricing provides a benchmark for the cross section of security prices in a model with more general preferences, endowments and asset returns. Empirical contradictions of CAPM might be explained by the fact that some agents are not mean-variance optimizers and that many securities have returns that are far from elliptical.
In this paper we show that independently of mean-variance preferences or normal returns, the CAPM pricing formula often provides a very good prediction for actual equilibrium returns. It is clear, of course, that it is always possible to construct economies where equilibrium asset prices are arbitrarily far from those predicted by CAPM. We do not provide a theoretical explanation for the documented phenomenon but instead compute hundreds of examples which illustrate it (see Judd (1997) for a general discussion which favors this approach to economic theory) -we approximate equilibria numerically (using the algorithm developed in Herings and Kubler (2000) ) and compare the prices and portfolio-holdings predicted by CAPM to the actual equilibrium prices and equilibrium portfolio-holdings. In all cases we consider, CAPM pricing is an excellent benchmark for the equilibrium prices. These results are robust with respect to variations in preferences, endowments and dividends.
In order to show that the CAPM pricing formula provides a good approximation to asset returns in realistically calibrated models, one rst has to clarify what one means by 'realistically calibrated'. We follow the macroeconomic literature and we choose rst and second moments of endowments and dividends to roughly match annual US data and preferences to exhibit relative risk aversion below 10 and nondecreasing absolute risk aversion (see e.g. Mehra and Prescott (1985) ) 2 . More importantly one has to argue that the computed examples are not sensitive to the exact speci cation of the model but that they re ect some general property of asset prices. We assume that there are three agents and 32 768 states of nature and we examine the robustness of CAPM with respect to 600 di erent speci cations of preferences and endowments: We rst assume that endowments and dividends are log-normally distributed and consider the following 3 speci cations for preferences.
All three agents have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions.
All agents' utility functions exhibit constant relative r i s k aversion (CRRA).
Agents' utility-functions exhibit loss aversion as in Benartzi and Thaler (1995) .
For each case we randomly generate 100 economies which di er with respect to agents' (heterogeneous) degrees of risk aversion.
In the next three cases we x preferences and vary distributions of dividends and endowments. We assume that all agents have CRRA utility functions and consider the following distributions for assets and endowments.
Endowments and dividends are drawn from a uniform distribution, We randomly generate 100 economies with di er with respect to the support of the uniform distributions.
Endowments and dividends are determined by t wo factors and an idiosyncratic shock each of which are drawn from a log-normal distribution. We randomly generate 100 economies with di er with respect to the factor-loads.
Endowments and dividends are drawn from a log-normal distribution and there is an option on one of the stocks. We randomly generate 100 economies which di er with respect to the strike-price of the option.
For all 600 economies under consideration we compare the computed return on individual stocks to the return predicted by the CAPM-pricing formula. We nd that in all 600 cases the average mean squared pricing errors (for returns) across stocks lie below 0.04 percent. The average error across all simulations is in the order of magnitude of 0.005 percent. In addition to predicting asset returns, the CAPM also predicts that all agents' equilibrium portfolio-holdings will consist of the riskless bondand a mutual fund of risky assets. It is possible that CAPM-pricing is very accurate, but two-fund separation does not apply. Nevertheless, in the computed examples two-fund separation holds almost exactly in the equilibria we compute.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we g i v e a short introduction to the model and collect several general results on CAPM in a general equilibrium setting. Section 3 gives an example of a realistically calibrated economy with non-elliptical returns and CRRA preferences for which CAPM-pricing provides an almost perfect prediction. In Sections 4 and 5 we examine the robustness of this phenomenon. In Section 4 we v ary the parameters of risk aversion for the CRRA case, we consider CARA utility functions, and we examine utility functions displaying loss aversion. In Section 5 we x preferences to exhibit constant relative risk aversion and we examine the robustness of CAPM with respect to dividenddistributions. In Section 6 we speculate about possible explanations and conclude the paper.
The Two-Period Finance Economy
The nance version of the GEI-model describes an economy over two periods of time, t = 0 1 with uncertainty o ver the state of nature resolving in period t = 1 . We describe the model, introduce the necessary notation and discuss the CAPM. For a thorough description of the GEI-model see for example Magill and Quinzii (1996 There are J assets. Asset j pays dividends at date t = 1 which w e denote by d j 2 IR S :
The price of asset j at time t = 0 is q j . Without loss of generality we assume that the assets are in zero net supply and we collect all assets' dividends in a pay-o matrix A = ( d Under an additional assumption of strictly increasing utility functions, existence of an equilibrium follows from the results of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
2.2
The Capital Asset Pricing Model Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) use the portfolio analysis developed by Tobin (1958) and Markowitz (1959) to examine an equilibrium model of nancial markets. Under the assumption that all agents are mean-variance optimizers they derive a closed-form solution for equilibrium returns, the so-called -pricing formula. This formula relates the return of a risky asset to the return of the market portfolio by the covariance of that asset with the market. It is well known that the -pricing formula can be derived in the nance GEImodel, see Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990) . To x notation and to give some intuition for the computational results in Sections 3 ; 5 we summarize and slightly generalize the ndings in the literature -Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990), Magill and Quinzii (1996) , Oh (1996) , and Willen (1997) -to cover the case with mean-variance preferences, non-marketed endowments and a n i t e state space in a world with incomplete markets.
We denote by 1 n = (1 : : : 1) > 2 IR n the vector of all ones. The m-th unit vector of appropriate dimension is denoted m -the dimension of m is always apparent from the context. Throughout this subsection we assume that there exist objective probabilities s s = 1 : : : S over the possible states of nature in period 1: Moreover, asset 1 is a riskless bond, d 1 = 1 S . For a random variable x 2 IR S we de ne its expected value E(x) = P S s=1 s x s , for two random variables x y 2 IR S we de ne the covariance as cov(x y) = P S s=1 s x s y s ; E(x)E(y): The variance of a random variable x 2 IR S is given by var(x) = cov(x x). Finally, w e de ne x y = P S s=1 s x s y s for vectors x y 2 IR S . 
While equation (2) relates the prices of the risky assets and looks similar to the CAPM pricing formula, this formula is rather useless if we h a ve no further information on A . Note that so far all formulas followed simply from the absence of arbitrage. It is well known that under the assumption that one agent h's utility function is di erentiable and that in an equilibrium with individual consumption (c h ) h2H , agent h's utility maximization problem has an interior solution, A can be characterized as
where proj hAi denotes the projection on hAi under the inner product .
One possibility t o d e r i v e a n i n teresting pricing formula is to assume that all preferences just depend on the mean and the variance of consumption To simplify matters, we rst assume q M 6 = 0 and then argue that this assumption is not necessary. Given a competitive equilibrium ( q ) we d e n e for a portfolio 2 IR J by = cov(r r M ) var(r M ) : Then we have the following result. 2 E(e e M ) and 1 S e e ? = 0 so E(e e M ) = E ( e e) it holds that 1 > 2 E(e e):
The CAPM pricing formula is obtained by substituting A = 1 1 ; 2 M in equation (2). 
We assume in the theorem that var(e e M ) > 0: The theorem also holds true for the degenerate case where e e M is collinear to 1 S , but since the proof of this simple fact is rather tedious it is omitted.
Note that for the case where the endowments are spanned, i.e. where e h ? = 0 for all h the pricing formula reduces to the standard CAPM-formula (see Magill and Quinzii (1996) ).
It might besensible to de ne the market portfolio somewhat di erently as a portfolio of risky assets only. This clari es the concept of two-fund separation, since then one The version of two-fund separation we consider in Theorem 2.3 is slightly more general than the usual one, where it is assumed that initial the initial income stream e h of every agent is marketed. As a consequence one obtains the formula e c h = h 1 1 S + h 2 e e when endowments are marketed. In the more general case considered in Theorem 2.3, the nal income stream consumed by each agent consists not only of the returns of a linear combination of the riskless bond and the market portfolio, but also of the undiversi able non-marketed individual part of the initial income stream, e e h ? : Finally, note that the concept of marketed endowments is not needed to de ne the pricing vector. Since e e ? is orthogonal to hAi the pricing vector can also be de ned by 9 e A = 1 1 S ; 2 e e: Of course it no longer holds that e A 2 hAi: Moreover, income streams not in hAi are typically priced di erently by e A than by A :
As we h a ve discussed in the introduction, Theorem 2.3 can only be obtained when one is willing to make v ery restrictive assumptions. As Magill and Quinzii (1996) put it when commenting on representative agent models and the CAPM: \As we indicated above t h e s e models are interesting since they lead to clearcut results which h a ve strong intuitive appeal. However the restrictive nature of the hypothesis made could cast doubt on the generality of the results." The important question we w ant to address is how m uch actual equilibrium prices and actual portfolio-holdings in a general setting will di er from the predictions of CAPM.
CAPM Without Mean-Variance Preferences
The assumption that all agents maximize a quadratic utility function is unattractive because it implies increasing absolute risk aversion. A more realistic assumption, and one commonly made in macroeconomics and nance, is that agents' preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion. It is clear, however, that with these preferences agents' will care about higher moments and that therefore a mean-variance analysis is not valid. The following example shows that a mean-variance utility function does not even serve as a good approximation of a constant relative risk aversion utility function. A standard way to calibrate equilibrium models under uncertainty is to assume that there are several uncorrelated shocks and to choose the magnitude of the shocks to match aggregate rst and second moments. From now on we examine an economy with three heterogeneous agents, representing classes of agents with low, medium or high incomes.
Each agent is endowed with an initial portfolio (0 h ; ) of the riskless bond and the available stocks, 5 with current income, representing current labor income plus dividends from h ; e s are generated by S independent draws from some given distribution. In this way we can obtain a discrete approximation of any continuous distribution.
The rst agent has no capital income, 
besolved is a multiple of the numberof states, whereas the numberof states is 1,024 for the current economy and 32,768 for the other economies considered in this paper. This makes both algorithms unsuitable for our purposes. In Herings and Kubler (2000) we develop an algorithm that is tailored to the nance GEI-model with one good perstate, and that is independent of the numberof states. Instead, the numberof equations to be solved is related to the numberof assets, which is 8 for most economies analyzed in this paper. Our algorithm therefore allows for an e ective and e cient computation in nance economies, which is imperative to address the issues in this paper.
The solid line in the gure is the security market line, i.e. the CAPM relationship between a portfolio's and its risk premium. The actual equilibrium expected returns of the seven securities are depicted by + and lie all almost exactly on the security market line. CAPM turns out to be an extraordinarily good predictor for the actual equilibrium returns of assets in this example. This is surprising as preferences are far from mean-variance, and asset returns are far from being normally distributed.
Although the graph of Figure 1 looks very convincing, it is clear that we need more objective measures to quantify the deviation of equilibrium prices and portfolio-holdings from the CAPM predictions. Note that we need to check both the robustness of two-fund separation and the robustness of the pricing-formula. With general preferences CAPMpricing is neither necessary nor su cient f o r t wo-fund separation. It is easy to see that twofund separation does not imply CAPM-pricing. Consider a model with complete markets where all agents have i d e n tical constant absolute risk aversion preferences. It is well known that two-fund separation holds since there exists a linear sharing rule, see also Cass and Stiglitz (1970) . However, it is easy to see that generally Conversely, suppose prices of assets consistent with CAPM-pricing are given, and let asset markets be complete for simplicity. It is easy to choose individual consumption bundles which do not belong to h1 S e ei and utility functions for which the individual consumption bundles are optimal at the asset prices chosen.
The most straightforward approach is to measure the accuracy of CAPM-pricing is to take the Mean Squared Error (MSE), which is de ned by Although the high-low speci cations for the random variables are two-point approximations to normal random variables the well-known fact that CAPM holds with normally distributed returns does not imply anything about the validity of CAPM in this framework. It is easy to see that two-point approximations to normal random variables do not satisfy the properties of elliptical distributions. The following trivial example shows that while each dividends distribution is characterized by its mean and variance it is not true that a linear combination of these random variables is also fully characterized by its mean and variance. One should not expect CAPM to hold in this model even though the distributions provide a ( v ery crude) approximation to normal distributions.
Also the fact that two-fund separation holds so well, comes as a surprise. Since the households we are dealing with have di erent parameters of relative risk aversion, there is no reason to expect that two fund separation obtains, see Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and Detemple and Gottardi (1998) . 4 
Robustness in Preferences
In order to show that the predictions of CAPM are a goodapproximation for equilibria in a wide variety of economic settings we compute 600 examples. We assume that there are S = 3 2 768 states of nature. Using a large numberof states guarantees that our nal samples are good approximations of continuous distributions. By taking a large number of states we rule out nite sample e ects on the prices of assets. When we replicate the experiment and generate economies out of a newly drawn sample, the equilibrium will be almost the same if the numberof states is su ciently large.
Throughout this section we assume that all random variables are log-normally distributed, so l h s f s and " j s are drawn independently from a log-normal distribution. The log-normal distribution with mean and variance 2 is denoted by LN ( 2 ): Since we are considering nite samples, the drawing will beof (some) in uence on the equilibrium we compute. As before asset 1 is the riskless bond. For j 2 The actual (f j s ) J j=2 are all based on a single realization of a normal random variable b f s : For each asset j we linearly transform the realization of this random variable in such a way that after taking the exponent a log-normally distributed random variable with mean 1 and variance c j 0:0161 results. The construction of the random variables implies that all dividends themselves are log-normally distributed. To get a similar variance of the entire stock market as before the variance of the factors and the idiosyncratic shock have to be chosen to be 0:0161 instead of 0:0169. Notice that the factor realization does not enter linearly in the formula for the asset's dividends, an assumption that is made in most models describing factor economies. This is an additional advantage as it puts CAPM only more seriously to the robustness test. Finally, it follows from the work of Feldstein (1969) that log-normal distributions do not belong to the elliptic class, and would not admit of two-fund separation.
We consider three di erent families of utility functions and compute fty randomly generated examples within each class. For each class we report histograms of the MSE, the Pricing R 2 and the Two-fund R 2 of agent 2 and 3. By market clearing, the portfolioholdings of agent 1 a r e fully dependent on those of agents 2 and 3. If two-fund separation holds exactly for agents 2 and 3 it will hold exactly for agent 1 as well. Therefore, we s a f e space and do not report the Two-fund R 2 of agent 1 . In all histograms the scaling is taken identically, s o that results for di erent models can be compared easily.
We rst assume that all agents' utility functions exhibit constant absolute risk aver, i.e. The rationale for examining both constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion is as follows. Kenneth Arrow has repeatedly argued that it is realistic assume increasing absolute risk aversion and non-increasing relative risk aversion. By covering the two extreme cases of constant absolute and constant relative r i s k a version we w ant to argue that CAPM provides a goodapproximation for pricing for all speci cations which satisfy Arrow's criteria. Obviously CAPM predicts extremely well. The mean squared error always lies below 0:04 percent. In most cases it is around 0:5 10 ;4 : The Pricing R 2 exceeds 0:9999 in all 6 The Pricing R 2 is multiplied by 100 to avoid round-o to 1.000 by our software. examples. The Two-fund R 2 exceeds 0:99 in most cases. Compared to the single example examined in Section 3, the results are slightly worse on average. Figure 3 clari es that this can beentirely explained by higher values for the average rate of risk aversion present in the economy. The MSE increases with average risk aversion in the economy, as measured by the harmonic mean of the h 's (it is well known that the harmonic mean is the right measure for average risk aversion in an economy where all agents have constant absolute risk aversion).
Although CAPM remains an excellent predictor for all cases examined so far, Figure 3 indicates that CAPM is a better tool in environments with lower average risk aversion. In the light of this result one might betempted to draw a parallel between our results and the observation of Mehra and Prescott (1985) that realistic values of risk-aversion do not produce a realistic equilibrium risk-premium. If the equilibrium returns of risky assets do not change signi cantly with small variations of agents' coe cient of relative r i s k a version it can be expected that the cross section remains almost unchanged and that CAPM (which predicts excess returns independently of preferences) provides a good prediction for a variety of attitudes towards risk. Note, however, that this can only explain one side of the phenomena -the question remains why the cross-section of returns can bedescribed by the assets' 's. The high values of the Pricing R 2 provides very useful information for the pricing of assets. Recall that the price of asset j is given by A d j : Any v ector that is highly correlated with A should lead to a similar price for asset j: In particular, when the Pricing R 2 is close to one, CAPM is bound to give almost exact equilibrium prices and the use of CAPM leads to a l o w MSE.
Loss Aversion
To demonstrate that our results do not depend on state independent utility, we analyze a class of utility functions that are state dependent and that are characterized by loss aversion. Such utility functions get support from empirical work on the decision making of agents. They are also claimed to be helpful in explaining the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985) , see Benartzi and Thaler (1995) . We cannot use exactly the same utility functions as Benartzi and Thaler, as these are not everywhere quasi-concave, and as a consequence a competitive equilibrium may not exist. The important characteristic of loss-aversion is not so much the existence of nonconcavities, but a sharp decrease in utility when loosing income compared to the status quo and only a mild increase in utility when gaining income. This is usually modeled by a utility function that has a kink at the status quo.
We generate a utility function with loss aversion as follows. We i d e n tify the status quo of an agent h in state s 1 with e h s : Then loss aversion applies to making good or bad investment decisions on the stock market. Consistent with Benartzi In principle, the parameter k s has to beadjusted to make v h s continuous. Since our algorithm works entirely with rst order conditions, this is of no concern to us. In the numerical experiments we t o o k e h; s = 0 :95e h s and e h+ s = 1 :05e h s . For each example we t a k e h 1 = h 2 =2 and we draw h 2 , h = 1 2 3 from a uniform distribution on the interval 1 6] . In this way 21 It turns out that CAPM is an extraordinarily good predictor for the case with loss aversion. The results seem to be even better than for the CRRA and CARA cases examined before. In most cases, MSE is below 1 10 ;4 Pricing R 2 exceeds 0:99999 and the Two-fund R 2 exceeds 0:98: If we t a k e i n to account that the examples with loss aversion are such that the degree of risk aversion is lower on average than before, the Pricing R 2 is comparable to the one found for CRRA and CARA preferences.
Robustness in Return Processes
We n o w x a g e n ts' preferences to exhibit constant relative risk aversion and choose We test the robustness of our results to variations in the distributions of endowments and assets. We consider three di erent families of return processes and compute 100 randomly generated examples within each class. We show the histograms of MSE, Pricing R 2 and Two-fund R 2 of agents 2 and 3.
Uniform Returns
In order to verify whether our results depend on the assumption of log-normal shocks, we now assume that all shocks are uniformly distributed. We also allow for some variation in the ratio of labor income to total income, in the variance of the factor and in the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks. Figures 6a-d show that the ability of CAPM to predict portfolio-holdings and excess returns is robust to the exact speci cation of the distribution of shocks. The results are very close to the ones obtained for the base case with log-normal shocks examined in Section 3, where the average degree of risk aversion in the economy is similar.
More Factors
One might w onder whether our results are not simply due to the fact that we h a ve all risky assets beingin uenced by a single common factor. In fact, it is possible to derive CAPM as a special case of APT where there is only one factor, see for instance Connor (1984) . However, such a derivation requires an uncountable number (or at least very large number) of assets to diversify the idiosyncratic shocks away. The importance of idiosyncratic shock is quite substantial in our economies with only seven risky assets. Moreover, usually factors enter linearly in the de nition of an asset's pay-o , which is not always the case in our economies. It seems therefore not likely that our results are due to the single factor set-up.
Other suspicious elements of the set-up we used so far are that factor loads are distributed very symmetrically and balanced, and that the importance of idiosyncratic shocks is the same for all assets. Finally, w e consider a wider range for the variance of the entire stock market.
In this subsection we generate a number of economies where risky assets depend on two factors, f and b f and factor loads for each one of the assets are randomly drawn. On top of this, also the importance of the idiosyncratic shock is randomly determined. The way to generate f j s j = 2 : : : J from a single realization of a normally distributed random variable is the same as in Section 3. The same applies to the other factor.
From Figure 7 we may conclude that the one factor framework is certainly not the driving force that makes CAPM work. Also in the two factor set-up, for a variety of factor loads, with assets that are di erent in the importance of the idiosyncratic shocks, CAPM turns out to be an excellent model. 5.3 Options Since markets are incomplete the introduction of an option on one of the assets will generally change all equilibrium prices (see Detemple and Selden (1991) ). Therefore one might expect that the introduction of an option worsens CAPM-pricing considerably. Furthermore, given the robustness of CAPM in the earlier examples, it is interesting to see if it is possible to give an equilibrium pricing formula for options in incomplete markets via CAPM.
Another reason to introduce an option is that this is an asset with the capacity to seriously alter the higher order moments of an asset portfolio. One possible explanation for our results obtained so far is that asset markets are very incomplete, which makes it di cult for households to change the higher order moments of the returns of their portfolios. Although households care for higher order moments, the mix of marketed assets makes it di cult to a ect the higher order moments. With the introduction of an option this clearly changes. Agents have then a possibility to limit downwards risk, which is exactly the kind of risk agents with CRRA utility functions are concerned about, but mean-variance optimizers are not.
In order to investigate this issue more closely we introduce a call option on the most risky asset. Speci cally we h a ve a 9-th security which p a ys max(d j s ; X 0) in state s, with X the strike price of the call option. Suppose we consider the uniquely determined equilibrium pricing vector A of the economy without the option, and we use this pricing vector to price the option. Given the reasoning of the previous paragraph, at those prices one would expect the call option (in combination with the bond) to be more attractive to the agents than the stock, exactly because of the higher order moments. So the equilibrium price of the call option should be higher than the one computed by CAPM-pricing, in order to make that asset less appealing. As a consequence, the expected equilibrium return of the call option should beless than the one predicted by CAPM.
To examine di erent options, we draw X out of the uniform distribution for each example. To avoid options that are either too far in or too far out of the money we determine in each example the minimal dividend paid out by asset 8 d expected dividend, and the average of the expected dividend and the maximal dividend. The results are given in Figures 8a-d . The MSE in Figure 8 refers to the MSE of the pricing of the stocks only. The option is analyzed in detail in Figure 9 . It turns out that the MSE, and the Two-fund R 2 are comparable to the ones given before. The Pricing R 2 is somewhat less goodthan before, but is still excellent. Surprisingly, we have found no systematic e ect of the introduction of the option on the price of asset 8. In some examples the introduction of an option raised the price above the CAPM-prediction, in others it has been lower. Figure 9 analyzes the pricing of the option by CAPM. According to CAPM, a call option is a very risky asset. It has zero pay-o s in bad states of nature, and very high in good states of nature. The covariance of a call option with the market portfolio is very high, which is also clear from Figure 9 , where it is shown that the option's varied from 5 to 35 in the economies generated. Notice that, as we expected, there is indeed an over-prediction of the expected return of an option by CAPM. In all economies generated, CAPM underpriced the call option. The misprediction was relatively small when the option's is low, say below 10, but may get quite severe for call options with a very high strike price, which are the ones with a high :Notice, however, that a higher of an option also corresponds to a higher excess return, which makes the relative misprediction less bad. Still, the overprediction of call option returns is more than linearly increasing in an option's whereas the excess return itself is still roughly linear.
It is surprising that the Pricing R 2 and the MSEs of stocks remained so good in all economies, even when the option was sometimes seriously under-priced by CAPM. In fact, it may e v enbeperceived as an inconsistency that the Pricing R 2 is virtually exactly correct, and the option is seriously mispriced. Indeed, when CAPM-pricing is highly correlated with A almost all assets are priced very well. The only exceptions are those like options with a v ery high strike price. Such an asset pays o in a few (less than 10) states of the 32,768 only. A high correlation with A is not inconsistent with a fairly di erent state price in a negligible fraction of states only. 6 
Interpretation and Conclusion
In order to show that the CAPM-pricing formula holds, one needs strong assumptions either on preferences or on dividends and endowments (see Berk (1996) ). However, examining the robustness of CAPM by computing equilibria, we nd that CAPM provides an excellent approximation to equilibrium excess returns and portfolio-holdings for a wide variety of preferences, dividends and endowments.
This result is very puzzling for two separate reasons. First, there is no a priori reason why in the absence of mean-variance prefernces or normal returns, the CAPM-pricing formula should provide a good approximation to actual equilibrium prices if there is only one agent in the economy or if markets are complete (which i s o b s e r v ationally equivalent). Secondly one would expect the presence of heterogeneous agents and incomplete nancial markets to alter the pricing implications of consumption based pricing models signi cantly.
We compute the complete market equilibirum for the examples considered. In almost all of the cases the complete markets pricing errors lie even below the incomplete market errors. In order to understand this rst puzzle, consider the simplest possible setup with a single agent who has log-utility and no labor-income. Suppose that the dividends of stocks j = 2 ::: 8 In order to show that = 0 the crucial insight is that For P 8 j=2 j 6 = 1 , 6 = 0 but the resulting pricing errors are small. As long as the coe cient of relative risk aversion remains low the pricing errors remain low if we vary the utility functions (see Figure 3) . However, while this argument shows that given our calibration one would expect CAPM to provide a good approximation to prices if there is only a single agent, one has to compute equilibria in order to assess how well CAPM predicts equilibrium prices in economies with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. Our current computational experience suggests that CAPM is an excellent tool to price assets in realistically calibrated economies with incomplete markets. The results seem to berobust for a wide variety of cases. The form of the utility functions, the distribution of the shocks, the number of factors, and the introduction of options do not a ect our results. The question which then arises out of the analysis in this paper is why the presence of incomplete markets does not have signi cant e ects on cross-sectional returns.
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